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1 Why developing countries need
to participate in international
negotiations
Negotiations are becoming an increasingly
important part of the international system, with
the increase particularly marked for developing
countries. Multilateral trade negotiations have
existed since the foundation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947,
but these negotiations have becomemore complex
and important for developing countries. These
negotiations are increasingly presented as being of
benefit to developing countries.The climate change
negotiations undertaken within theUnitedNations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) use concepts like “equity” and ask that
developed country parties should take the lead in
combating climate change. The current Round of
world trade negotiations was christened the
“Development Agenda” and there is strong pressure
on developing countries to use trade activities in
development and poverty reduction.
Are these negotiations actually important for
poverty and development? Can developing
countries participate effectively in these
negotiations, and can they obtain benefits from
such participation? What lessons can be learnt
from past negotiations about whether developing
country participation is effective and how it might
be made more effective? Can international
institutions or donors help? Finally, what are the
implications for more extensive and increasingly
effective developing country participation in such
negotiations for the way these negotiations are
conducted?
2 Poverty effects from trade
Examination of the relationships among trade, trade
policy and poverty shows (Page 2001 and Bird
2003, for an extensive discussion and bibliography)
that trade canhave significant effects on total income
and on its distribution, and therefore on poverty.
The direct impact on poverty of particular changes
in trade, which may be attributable to changes in
trade policy, which in turn may be attributable to
negotiating success or failure can be traced, through
price, employment and fiscal effects to incomes and
then through household analysis, to the income
and assets aspects of poverty.
Trade policy, which reduces barriers to trade
increases some incomes (and normally reduces
others), through changes in the composition of
production and in relative prices and perhaps
through changes in government income (and
therefore spending). This may have a direct effect
on poverty (sectoral and household analyses are
required). If policy (unlike normal trend changes
in trade) creates abrupt changes (losses of a whole
sector), the effects may be more severe. More
opportunities in trade (through imports or access
for exports) are likely to increase national income
andmay increase efficiency sufficiently to increase
growth. This may have direct effects on poverty
(the evidence is that it is likely, but not inevitable)
and clearly has effects on the potential to reduce
poverty, depending on government policy response.
Both the macroeconomic and the sectoral and
distributional effects are now well studied.
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3 Poverty effects from climate
change
In other areas of international intervention, the
analysis is less well established, but analysis of
the relationships among climate change, climate
conventions and poverty (McGuigan et al. 2002;
Richards 2002) indicates that climate change
impacts will be particularly damaging to poor
countries, and that some of the measures pro-
posed to mitigate it can have important distribu-
tional effects. This is reflected in the increasing
prominence of poverty and sustainable develop-
ment questions in the UNFCCC negotiations.
Climate change is predicted to deepen pover-
ty both directly and indirectly. The direct impacts
include the loss of life, livelihoods, assets, infra-
structure, etc., from climatic extreme events. The
indirect effect is due to the effect on economic
growth; continuing climate change variation is
predicted to alter the sectoral origins of growth,
including the ability of the poor to engage in the
non-farm sector, as well as increase inequality,
and therefore to reduce the poverty elasticity of
growth (ERM 2002). The effects come from:
n Reductions in crop yields in most tropical and
subtropical regions due to decreased water
availability and new or changed insect pest
incidence. Such changes would have a major
impact on food security, employment,
incomes, and economic growth. For example,
one study has predicted a 9–25 per cent fall in
net farm revenue in India from a temperature
rise of 2–3.5˚C; reductions in crop yields can
be expected to lead to localised food price
rises.
n Huge displacement of people from coastal and
densely populated low-lying areas like the
Bangla, Mekong and Yangtze Deltas, while
islands like Tuvalu, Kiribati, Anguilla and the
Maldives could disappear.
n Exposure of millions of people to new health
risks, especially from vector-based diseases
like malaria and schistosomiasis, as well as
waterborne diseases such as cholera and
dysentery. Malnutrition from the reduction in
crop yields would increase the severity of
these diseases and health impacts are likely to
have an effect on growth.
n Climate change will increase the frequency
and severity of extreme climatic events.
Poorer developing countries are most at risk,
since they are more reliant on agriculture, more
vulnerable to coastal and water resource changes
and have less financial, technical and institution-
al capacity for “adaptation”.
In principle, the direct effects of trade or cli-
mate change on poverty could be redistributed
by government intervention. But for countries
with limited administrative and fiscal capacity to
redistribute income, the type of trade and climate
change policy matters for poverty impact.
4 Can developing countries gain
from participating in trade negoti-
ations?1
Two pessimistic views argue that they cannot. If
the outcomes of negotiations depend on the bal-
ance of power, then no amount of negotiating will
make a difference. The predicted outcome can
change only if power changes, for example the
rise of the EU in the GATT/World Trade
Organization (WTO) from the 1950s to the pre-
sent (Jawara and Kwa 2003). The second cause
for pessimism is based on observation. It is
argued that developing countries have achieved
little or have even lost in trade, climate change
and other environmental negotiations.
But in apparent contradiction to these views,
developing countries themselves are putting
more resources into participation in negotiations.
They have proved first that they can modify the
outcome, then that they can block a settlement
and finally, that they can initiate their own issues.
This can be seen clearly from the way that trade
decisions have evolved from the 1950s to the
present.
There were good reasons why it was not in the
interests of developing countries to participate in
trade negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s.
Inward-orientated development strategies
implied that there was little to gain from exports
and little to lose (and possibly something to gain)
from maintaining tariffs and quantitative restric-
tions to exclude imports. A country following this
strategy should put minimal resources into inter-
national negotiations. The GATT negotiations
excluded from consideration many of the prod-
ucts of most export interest to them (agriculture
and textiles), and networks of trade preferences
like that for the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and
Pacific countries) by the EU or for the Caribbean
by the USA gave them better-than-GATT trading
terms without negotiation. On most trade rules,
they could choose to opt out.
However, by the time of the Uruguay Round
(1986–94),muchmore was at stake for developing
countries. They (and their development advisers)
were emphasising export promotion and agriculture
and textiles were on thenegotiating table.Developed
countries were pressing for access to developing
country markets and also sought a substantial number
of agreements on issues such as intellectual property,
customs valuation, anti-dumping and the use of
subsidies.Critically, theUruguay Round established
the “single undertaking”.Countries could no longer
pick and choose which parts of the agreement they
would sign up to. That they had to sign up for the
whole agreement raised the stakes considerably.
By the end of theUruguay Round, some progress
had beenmade on both agriculture and textiles and
clothing. While developed country agricultural
protectionism remained, the tariff, subsidy and
quota arrangements were brought under WTO
discipline.The long-standing (from the early 1960s)
restrictions on developing country exports of their
principal manufactures, textiles and clothing, under
theMultifibre Arrangement, were scheduled to be
phased out within 10 years.
At the end of the Round, developing countries
concluded that those who had gained were those
who had participated in the negotiations. While
those who hadmost to gain had participatedmost
actively, the conclusion most non-participating
countries drew was that absence was damaging.
This is evidenced by the increased resources many
formerly non-participating countries have put into
missions and by their increased interest in the
activities of the WTO, as well as in statements by
trade officials.
These factors changed the context for the next
Round of trade negotiations, which was scheduled
to begin five years later at the SeattleMinisterial in
1999.At this meeting, developing countries’ refusal
to accept a process from which they had been
excluded led to a collapse of the meeting. There
were other reasons for the failure, but the developing
countries concluded that there had been a further
shift in the real balance of power: developing
countries could not only negotiate, they could block
negotiations.
There was further progress evident at Doha, in
2001.While the broad support for the successful
anti-subsidy position in agriculture precludes
claiming this as a developing country achievement,
there were other clear victories:
1. Themeeting accepted that special anddifferential
treatment (allowing different policies by
developing countries and requiring different
policies towards them) would be “an integral
part” of any final settlement; theUruguay Round
had offered only minor adjustments to policy
and non-obligatory concessions.2
2. Doha also extended the times for Least
Developed Countries to comply with subsidy
and intellectual property rules.These issues were
accepted at Doha in spite of initial strong
opposition by developed countries, indicating
that these countries thought they were a
necessary part of any bargain.
3. TheDohameeting also showed that developing
countries could initiate new negotiating issues.
Developing country positions included not only
the issues of traditional concern to them
(agriculture, non-tariff barriers, tariff
discrimination and escalation) and opposition
to the new ‘developed country issues’
(investment, competition policy, labour), but
also new subjects for the agenda: the importance
of infrastructure for trade, linkages between debt
and trade, and the nature of commodity markets.
The developing countries thus had broadened
the definition of “development issues” beyond
that suggested by those developed countries
advocating a “development round”: technical
assistance and liberalising trade. One of these
new agenda items was approved at Doha: a new
working group on ‘the relationship between
trade, debt and finance’.
At the mid-term ministerial meeting to review
progress on Doha, at Cancun in September 2003,
developing countries placed two new issues on the
agenda: the specific effect ofUSagricultural subsidies
on cotton onMali, Chad, Benin, and Burkina Faso
and the effect of general liberalisation on the few
countries, which arehighly dependent onpreferences
and other types of special access (notably the Least
Developed Countries and those with quotas for
sugar). Both had been recognised in general terms,
but targeted and quantified studies (Goreux 2003;
ILEAP 2003; IMF 2003) of the effects of specific
measures on specific countries were used to bring
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them to prominence. Both issues were introduced
into the revision of thedraft final statement andboth
are now clearly on the international agenda. The
collapse of themeeting, however, was probably the
result of a decision by the USA, not the opposition
of the developing countries.
5 Why have developing countries
become more effective in trade
negotiations?
Given the undoubted power of the leading
developed countries, how has it been possible for
developing countries to have made such progress
in trade negotiations? The answer appears to be
that in multilateral negotiations, the bargaining
power of the strongest nations is limited by the
need for agreements to be finalised. If a powerful
country wants market access and if this requires
action by another country, it must secure its
agreement.The studies on negotiations and country
experiences (Page 2002; Bojanic 2001a,b; Durrant
2002; Hess 2001) identify when small countries
have been able to turn this potential into reality by
negotiating effectively and changing outcomes.
5.1 The importance of experience
Developing country trade negotiating capacity has
clearly benefited from the experience of successive
trade rounds. In 1986, at the beginning of the last
trade negotiations, developing countries did not
realise that the open-ended or vague commitments
in the agenda could become significant agreements.
Services, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) – patents and copyright –
and the single undertaking were all in the
negotiating mandate, but their implications were
not clear.At the Seattleministerial meeting in 1999,
which had the task of setting the agenda for the
following round, a detailed rejection of points in
the agenda by developing countries led to failure;
at Doha (2001) developing countries moved beyond
rejection alone and were active in setting the agenda,
realising that they could not remain outside any
negotiation, however irrelevant or unimportant it
might seem initially. At Cancun, they scrutinised
the proposals in detail.
Developing countries are now able to develop
more sophisticated positions, for example, on the
issue of services. In theUruguay Round they began
with little information about their own interests.
By the time of the Doha meeting, 15 years later,
there was greater confidence and precision in offers
and positions.
The emergence of better-informed policy
positions in the course of the Uruguay Round
discussion of services and the improvements seen
in competence of individual country delegations
in the Round suggest that long negotiations can
help to produce informed outcomes for new
subjects or new participants. At the beginning,
Brazil and India were almost the only countries to
be effective: they had been active in the previous,
Tokyo, Round. During the Uruguay Round,
Argentina, Bangladesh and other Asian and Latin
American countries started to be active. At the
Seattle conference and between then and theDoha
conference (2001), the countries which had been
inexperienced participants in theUruguay Round
began to plan a more active role, and even the
African countries started to define and present
negotiating positions (more than half the position
papers before Seattle and Doha were from
developing countries). The countries that had
participated without experience and with little
success in the Uruguay Round, were now seeing
their second Round and started to share the
advantages of the “old” developing country activists.
The pressure for limited duration Rounds may not
be in the interests of developing countries.3
In the preparations for the Cancun meeting,
again all countries, including the least active
negotiators among the Least DevelopedCountries,
presented positions and participated in meetings
of groups, in particular the African Union and the
Least DevelopedGroup. This greater participation
was reflected in the way the negotiations themselves
were organised. The groups where able to choose
their own representatives to the consultations by
subject and smaller, “Green Room”, meetings,4
rather than being selected by the Chair of the
meeting (as in the past).New countries (e.g.Ghana
for agriculture) started to come to prominence.
5.2 The role of alliances in strengthening
negotiating positions
Since theUruguay Round, the growing importance
of regional trading groups among developing
countries has led to an interest in using these as
negotiating blocs, and some of the negotiating
positions have been defined by region. However,
only the EU negotiates as a bloc for multilateral
trade rounds. Not even the customs unions like
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CARICOM (Caribbean Community), Mercosur,
SACU (Southern African Customs Union) and
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa) negotiate as blocks.5 The Free
TradeAreas (FTAs) have not shown any interest in
joint negotiation, even when (as with SADC and
some other ACP regions) there are proposals to
transform them eventually into customs unions.
This suggests that most of the regions are seen
primarily as a way of increasing the integration of
members within the regionmembers, with the need
to have a common external position accepted as a
(perhaps inconvenient) consequence. They have
not been formed, not as negotiating blocs to
strengthen their position in the world economy. It
means that the ACP regions (except, to a limited
degree, CARICOM) have no policy basis or
institutional structure for the negotiations they are
expected to undertake with the EU under the new
ACP-EU proposals for free trade areas between
regions and the EU. This point is discussed further
below.
Instead, common characteristic groups (e.g.Least
Developed Countries or the small island states) as
well as exporters of particular commodities such as
sugar have emerged as more important in
formulating positions than the FTAs. At Doha, the
Least DevelopedCountries secured a range of special
mentions, and avoided any expressions of opposition
to special treatment for them; the small economies
got a ‘work programme to examine issues’. Unlike
formally established regional groups among
developing countries, theAfricaGroup was effective
inmobilising support for the developing countries’
own initiative issues,notably debt.This group, which
includes the various regional trade groups, and
which is more like the common characteristic groups
than the formal regions, started tomeet in the run-
up to the Seattle meeting, and has become
increasingly important in coordinating positions.
Another group, which started to emerge in
Seattle, is a much more fluid group of leading
developing countries. The long-established
leadership of India and Brazil was extended to
include Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. All have
a common interest in continuing liberalisation in
theWTOcontext, although with very different (and
potentially opposed) interests in particular elements
of the negotiation. Their interests are also in some
respects very different from those of the smaller
economies (where trade is amuchmore important
part of the economy), so that they are not seen as
(although they may see themselves as) leaders of
the old developing country alignment. All could
be seen as leaders of regional groups: Mercosur,
NorthernAfrica, SAARC (SouthAsianAssociation
for Regional Cooperation), ECOWAS (Economic
Community of West African States) and SADC
(SouthernAfricanDevelopment Community).Brazil
and SouthAfrica, at least, have acted informally as
reporters-back to the LatinAmerican and Southern
African countries respectively in the WTO
negotiations. Other smaller countries, such as
Jamaica, Mauritius and Bangladesh, have also
emerged as frequent leaders in taking positions,
chairing committees, etc.Where there are general
developed–developing country issues (special and
differential treatment, the inclusion of the new
issues like investment and competition policy),
agreement from this set can constitute a developing
country position, although on more specialised
questions, they are not representative.
At Cancun, there was the first semi-formal
recognition of groups among the developing
countries (and of anew group among the developed:
theG10, those least willing to liberalise agriculture,
led by Switzerland).Countries presented positions
saying that they were on behalf of groups like the
Africa Group and Least Developed Countries and
the Chairs of the groups were chosen to represent
developing countries in both the informal
consultations on various issues during the
conference and in the Green Room in the final
stages. There were explicit arrangements for them
to “report back” to their “constituencies”. During
the negotiations, individual groups had procedures
for regular consultation and consideration of
positions and arranged negotiations with other
groups to arrange common positions.
A new group, the G20 (or now G20+), of
developing country agricultural exporters (but
including the traditional leaders, Brazil, India, South
Africa, Eygpt, now joined by China), emerged in
the weeks before the conference, and acted much
more formally together than the others. It secured
the two symbols of “recognition” at the talks:
representation in consultations the Green Room
and a meeting room of its own. Its emergence,
combined with the emergence of the G10 on the
other side of the agricultural negotiations, and the
strong divide between the developed and
developing countries on the developed country
Developing Countries in International Negotiations
75
proposal to introduce regulation of investment,
competition policy, government procurement and
trade facilitation, the “Singapore issues”,meant that
theCancunMinisterial was perhaps the first meeting
since the 1970s where the divisions were almost
uniformly between developed and developing
countries.The divisions within each grouping were
less important. The EU-ACP alliance of Doha, the
Cairns alliance of all efficient agriculture countries
of the Uruguay Round and other developed–
developing alliances were no longer important.
Common characteristic groups come together
for a general agenda, not just a single negotiating
topic, and therefore have to negotiate and settle
differences of interests among themselves. Interest
groups, like the G20 for agriculture or sugar
exporters only work together on that issue.
Common characteristic groups therefore, may be
less likely than are exporter-groups to survive
detailed national assessment of interests.
6 Climate change negotiations
The same development of negotiating capabilities
through both experience and the formation of
developing country interest groupings has yet to
be seen in negotiations on climate change. In these
negotiations, some conditions remain less favourable
(Richards 2001, 2002). While the risks to
developing countries are becoming clear, the
potential gains from the current negotiations are
less so; the choice of how strongly to participate is
therefore more difficult. And there is less pressure
fromdeveloped countries for developing countries
to participate: wealthy countries have little to gain
from an international regime, because they are
geographically less vulnerable.
6.1 Less experience
Climate convention negotiations began in the 1990s,
a period when developing country participation
and separate treatment were accepted from the
beginning. At the annual meetings, developing
countries (notably Brazil) have begun to make
proposals, but they have not been able to alter any
outcomes of the negotiations. A fundamental
disagreement remains over whether the principle
of equity in responding to climate change implies
that all countries must bear some responsibility for
reducing emissions (broadly speaking theNorthern
view), or that the Northern countries that are
responsible for most emissions should bear most
of the burden of responding to the challenge
(broadly speaking, the Southern view).6
Developing countries have maintained a fairly
consistent position.Most have continued to oppose
joining in any actions to reduce emissions, on the
grounds of fairness.Most have argued that developed
countries should reduce emissions, rather than
achieving their targets through trading emissions
permits and theother offset mechanisms in theKyoto
Protocol. Countries have thus tended to take
‘defensive’ strategies, and to focus more on issues
and principles than interests. This has precluded
active participation in the negotiations and allowed
developed countries to settle for weaker targets.
The new perception (IPCC 2001) that climate
change impacts are now irreversible given the time
lag between mitigation actions and their effect on
the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases,
and will be most severe on poor people in poor
countries,has changeddeveloping country attitudes.
For developing countries, the climate change
“adaptation” agenda has become as important as
the “mitigation” agenda.
The commitment by developing countries in
climate change negotiations to not taking on
obligations is more like the 1970s developing
country position in trade negotiations, of wanting
a separate regime, than the 1980s and 1990s model
of active participation, offering concessions in return
for demands. One reason for this is that those
developing countries which havemost to gain from
climate change negotiations (or most to lose from
inaction) are determined by geography and climate;
they are not necessarily the most developed and
ready to negotiate, while in trade it is (in general)
themore advanced countries that have seen benefits
from negotiations and have participated earliest
andmost extensively.Except in themost vulnerable
countries (and not even in some of these), climate
change has not risen in domestic policy priorities
as trade has, since the 1990s.
Overall, most developing countries thus seem
still at the post-Uruguay or Seattle stage of feeling
too disadvantaged and excluded to participate
effectively. The disadvantages mentioned by
countries are the same as in trade: small and
inexperienced delegations, lack of national research
support, lack of familiarity with how negotiations
are done.Many countries have still not identified
a strong interest in the outcome of climate change
negotiations, and therefore choose to devote few
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resources to them, while there is little pressure on
them tomeet climate objectives: they aremarginal
to the major commitments being made on
greenhouse gases.
6.2 Weaker alliances
In the climate change negotiations, although the
G77 plus China Group remains themost important
developing country coalition, there are important
differences in negotiating positions and interests.
OPEC (oil exporting) countries have not wanted
strong mitigation of climate change, while the
Association of Small-Island States (AOSIS) grouping
wants strong action.Countries with serious climate
change concerns, but with a possibility of obtaining
payments in the Clean Development Mechanism
Market (CDM-CER), have mixed interests. As in
the trade negotiations, this led some to leave the
common-characteristic groups. These are, in any
case, less clear and weaker in climate change,
although the Least Developed Countries and the
Africa Group have been active, indicating that these
are now more than ad hoc alliances for the WTO
negotiations. The all-developing country position
may remain stronger than in trade because there
are fewer sectoral interests of the type found in trade
negotiations and perhaps also because of the
stronger commitment by most developing countries
to the principles and the defensive position.AOSIS
is emerging there as well as in trade as one of the
best-organised groups. There are occasional
developing–developed country alliances, but some
criticise these as ‘divide and rule’ tactics by the
developed countries.
In climate change, the developed–developing
divide has been more persistent. The North tends
to placemore emphasis on disaster prevention and
preparedness. The South argues that given the
irreversibility of climate change impacts, this is
inadequate for short-term threats; it places more
emphasis on disaster relief.
7 Challenges for future
negotiations
The growing effectiveness of developing countries
faces three potential problems:
n how to integrate the parallel increase in the
effectiveness of national pressure interest groups
into the negotiations;
n how to adapt the multilateral system to take
account of the new participants; and
n whether developing countries can use their new
skills effectively in the growing number of
bilateral North–South negotiations.
7.1 The role of the private sector
In the Uruguay Round, the developed countries
had faced lobbying from industrial interests,
particularly on the “new” issues – services,
intellectual property, and rules.However, they had
been able to use private industrial groups and firms
to provide the expertise which was not available
within the government, increasing their
understanding of the issues at stake and the
effectiveness of their negotiating stance. This
example convinced some developing countries that
the advantages of having an informed private sector
more involved in negotiations outweighed any
disadvantages from potential opposition or
interference.Most developing countries lacked not
only the industry groups, but also any formal
mechanisms for their participation.This meant that
there was neither support from private industry
knowledge nor commitment to the results.
Negotiations were entered into without studying
the implications for key economic sectors and
negotiating positions were of a general, “sweeping”
or political nature, not backed up by solid evidence.
There were inadequate consultations with both the
private sector and civil society.
But after theUruguay Round this changed. The
greater coverage of the agreement meant that
domestic interests found themselves affectedby new
rules (TRIPs, standards, etc.).Better communications
meant that the protests in the more informed
countries (not only in developed countries, but also
in India) were heard in the less active.And theWTO,
UNCTAD, and bilateral donors, for the first time
prepared a major campaign to inform all interests
in even the inactive countries of the results and their
implications.Governments therefore faced not only
their own new perception that if they participated
actively, they could influence the result, but also
strong and informed external pressure to act more
effectively in the future. This strong private sector
lobbying and the resulting pre-meeting agreements
on formal national positions, however, can make
any compromises or alliances more difficult.
Delegations without national support or interest
had had considerable freedom to act, to form
alliances, and to accept exclusion from decisions.
Cancun illustrated the consequences of these
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changes.Developing countries followed the example
of the developed countries and brought not only
government officials from ministries other than
trade (e.g. agriculture and health for negotiations
on intellectual property), but representatives of
their major national interests. These had side
meetings with their counterparts on the margins
of the main negotiations (e.g. in sugar), but also
participated directly in formation of positions and
reactions to positions taken by others in the
negotiations. This is likely to have made it more
difficult for governments to alter their positions
and trade off different national interests.The format
of themeeting, with the prominence given to official
ministerial statements of position and, in many
cases, repeated endorsement of group positions
taken in advance of the meeting, also made
compromise or flexibility difficult to arrange.
Delegations with a clear mandate, from their
own government, perhaps in consultation with
economic or other interests, may have much less
flexibility to defer to themore powerful or to form
alliances with other opponents. They must
demonstrate that they participated actively.
Deadlock may not be inevitable, but may now be
more likely, and certain negotiations will be harder
and longer. If the refusal of theUSA to compromise
on agriculture had not ended the meeting
prematurely, these rigidities might have prevented
agreement.
8 How the international
negotiations must adapt
InGATT negotiations prior to theUruguay Round,
there were no formal procedures for negotiations
and consultations. In the early rounds, the USA
dominated proceedings and by the 1970s, US-EU
bilateral meetings were the forum in which
agreements were reached.While theUruguay Round
had seen some increase in formal negotiations,
supplementing, if not replacing theEU-USbilateral
meetings of previous Rounds, there was still aheavy
emphasis on “informal” meetings. These consisted
of ad hoc groups, with virtually no rules of procedure
or specification of who should attend.These do not
only become increasingly impractical with more
and more inexperienced participants, but do not
offer the official evidence of participation which
countries now require tobe accountable to interested
and informed national groups.
In the final months before the Seattle meeting
in 1999, new procedures were introduced so as to
include all countries, at least occasionally, in the
consultations on the agenda for negotiations. This
followed what had been established as the normal
“informal” procedure in negotiations in theUruguay
Round, of small committees, which were effectively
open to anyone who was known to have an interest.
Countries which were too new or small (or absent
fromGeneva and the negotiations) to be known to
have an interest were not always included, but it
avoided official discrimination among countries,
and was accessible to the active countries that might
challenge their exclusion.
In 2001, theWTO and its major members still
supported informal consultations. Although some
developing countries continued to question their
legitimacy, two successive competent chairs of the
GeneralCouncil were able to engage and be trusted
by most of the delegations. This, together with a
general desire to avoid a second failure,meant that
the system avoidedbreakdown, but it remained weak.
In 2003,developing countries proposed reforms
to ensure that bothdraft papers andprocedures were
decided by official committees (WTO 2003), but
this was not adopted. At Cancun, the informal
procedures weremade as formal as possible, in that
the official representatives of the informal groups
were treated as their representatives.But the absence
of any formal means for the groups to adjust their
negotiatingpositions was one reason (combined with
the absence of, first, as competent a chair of the
meeting as at Doha, and second as compelling a
reason for the developed countries to compromise
as the 9/11 attacks), that it was not possible to secure
agreement. The presence of a large number of
interests, within countries and among countries,
now increasingly clearly asserted, means that if
country representatives and then theWTO are to
represent these interests and be accountable back to
them, thenmore formal structures willbe necessary.
As suggested in the evidence from theUruguay
Round, the compression of the negotiations also
made it more difficult for countries to consider the
consequences of new offers, analyse their impact
on national economies, and rearrange alliances.
The structure of the meetings, with consultations
on any new positions among groups of up to 60
countries, many with more than one interest
represented within the country, requires more
formal structures within the groups and/or more
than the one hour typically available for consultation
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and consideration of positions.
Similar problems can be expected in the climate
change negotiations. These also rely heavily on
informalmeetings during negotiations. If developing
country participation there becomes more active,
informed anddifferentiated according to thediffering
interests within the developing world, then these
informal negotiating procedures will not be adequate.
8.1 Transferring the new skills to other
negotiations: the Africa, Caribbean and
Pacific Countries (ACP) experience
It has been argued here that developing countries
have been able to participate more effectively in
recent trade rounds. Can the lessons learnt from
the negotiations be applied to bilateral negotiations?
This issue was examined in the case of the
negotiations between theEU and its associatedACP
countries. In this case, there is much less evidence
of serious participation by developing countries
and no sign of success for them (Solignac-Lecomte
2001). Until 2000, trade relations were entirely
non-reciprocal: the EU established preferences, but
did not require specific concessions from the ACP
countries, so there was no opportunity or need to
negotiate. However, the EU’s 1998 proposals to
change from preferences to reciprocal free trade
required negotiation for the first time.The countries
have not yet adjusted to this change and were unable
to mobilise opposition to the new regime. They
were not able to protect the special commodity
arrangements (e.g. sugar). They did not secure
consultation in the face of new arrangements with
other countries (Eastern Europe, Mexico, Chile,
SouthAfrica, etc.) which have reduced their margin
of preference.
This failure raises some important questions.As
some of the countries in the ACP are among those
active in the WTO, and the same people were
frequently involved in both sets of negotiations,
why was there such adifference in negotiating ability
and outcomes? The main reason for the difference
appears to be the fact that when negotiating with
the EU, the role of the EU as donor was emphasised
as part of the same negotiation. ACP negotiators
could not simultaneously demand equal treatment
as trading partners and beg for aid.
The nature of ACP-EU negotiations also
precluded the development of effective alliances
among the ACP countries. The ACP are all small
countries, and almost all of them are among the
more inexperienced in negotiations, so there are
no actors like India and Brazil to lead coalitions
and provide research and support.The EU decided
that the appropriate division would be by regional
group, not by common characteristic; it divides the
Africa Group into four to five regions. Although it
subsequently offered adifferent trading arrangement
to the Least Developed, it has not accepted this as
an appropriate division among ACP countries for
the negotiations (there are Least Developed in all
the chosen regions, so all have to deal with the
different interests). Some sectoral interests are trying
to coordinate (notably sugar exporters), but the
pattern of negotiations can be considered as both
an explanation for weak ACP effectiveness in
negotiation (they do not have the normal alliances
available), and also an example of it (they have not
resisted the EU’s division effectively).
If the failure ofmultilateral negotiations, in trade
at Cancun, in climate change over theKyotoProtocol
and in other subjects, reinforces the trend towards
bilateral negotiations, the experience of the ACP
(for which there are parallels in Central America
negotiations with the USA, for example) suggests
that developing countries, particularly those which
are weak and inexperienced, will be at a greater
disadvantage in these than in multilateral. For
developed countries, avoiding the new alliances of
developing countries in theWTO is an additional
reason for preferring the bilateral rounds.
Is this likely to become a substitute for theWTO
(and other multilateral fora)? For small developing
countries this is a possible and potentially serious
problem.However, the larger countries have shown
more ability in these negotiations as well.Mexico
chose to negotiate NAFTA (North American Free
TradeAgreement), and then preserved its access to
more diversified markets by negotiating parallel
agreements with the EU and (now in progress)
Japan. South Africa negotiated first with the EU
and is now negotiating with theUS. Brazil, with or
without the rest ofMercosur, is also looking in both
directions, and its negotiations with the US after
Cancun also failed. The risk is an unstable system
of some arrangements imposed by developed
countries on their satellites and interlocking
agreements with the middle-level countries (with
all the disadvantages of trade diversion and
inefficient rules of origin).
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and institutions, in information about how others
negotiate effectively, and in reformof someprocedures
of the international institutions which work against
weak or inexperienced countries.
Notes
* This article is based on the results of a study, ‘Effective
Participation by Developing Countries in International
Governance, Institutions andNegotiations’. The papers
in the Bibliography by Alan Bojanic, NigelDurrant, Peter
Frost, Richard Hess, Michael Richards, Henri-Bernard
Solignac-Lecomte, as well as by the author were prepared
for that. I am grateful to the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) for financing the
research project, which was part of theGlobalisation and
Poverty Programme. I amgrateful to JohnHumphrey for
his comments and suggestions throughout the project.
For further information on this project, please contact
Sheila Page at: s.page@odi.org.uk.For further information
on the Globalisation and Poverty Programme, see
www.gapresearch.org
1. These issues are alsobeing explored in the researchproject
‘DevelopingCountries and theTradeNegotiationProcess’,
under thedirectionof JohnS.Odell, University ofSouthern
California, in association with the University of Geneva.
For further information see www.ruig-gian.org/conf/
negocecommprogpapers.htm
2. The issue of special and differential treatment was the
subject of a recent IDS Bulletin (Stevens 2003).
3. Negotiating experience was also acquired in the regional
trade negotiations in which most Latin American,
Caribbean and African countries had participated by
1999.This provided experience in identifying negotiating
issues and allies and, in negotiation itself. These
negotiations also generated analysis and data, on trade
rules, trade patterns and interests, useful in themultilateral
negotiations.
4. There are no formal procedures for WTO Ministerial
meetings.The custom is for the chair to designate “friends”
to hold consultations on the principal issues, partly open,
partly with the principal interest groups, and then to
consolidate the positions in a “Green Room” meeting of
principal countries. At Seattle, these were the largest
countries, plus countries which the chair chose to
represent the others.
5. TheCARICOMcountries have taken some steps towards
negotiating trade regionally. They agreed jointly on the
tariff that was eventually bound, and in 2003, they
adopted a common approach on services, and as a group
Some developing countries now believe that they
have clear interests in the results of international
negotiations. Many have become convinced that
trade can have significant effects on their total
income and on their development. Most believe
that the effects of climate change will be particularly
damaging to poor countries, while some of the
measures proposed to mitigate it could provide
significant financial benefits.Although trade policy
and climate change policies may not be the most
important or direct policy instruments against
poverty, for countries with limited administrative
and fiscal capacity, the outcomes of trade and climate
change negotiations matter for poverty.
Having identified interests in the negotiations,
developing countries have attempted to participate.
By participating, they have learned some lessons
that are making them more effective:
n Participation is working best in the longest
established negotiations (WTO, not climate
change), with the broadest range of allies and
least obvious dependency (WTO, not ACP).
n It works best when and where developing
countries canperceive their interests most clearly.
In climate change, there are still complaints that
developing countries are excluded andhave little
voice. At Doha however, developing countries’
participation was reasonably effective (small, weak
countries will never take control from the larger).
n At Cancun, developing and some developed
countries both blocked the agreement; the
developing countries again secured small
initiatives.But many countries have not yet made
the transition to interest-based, effective
participation, and the institutions have not yet
been changed to be appropriate for more players
with more complex interests.
Countries need domestic capacity to coordinate
official andprivate objectives in the negotiations, to
be able to prepare an informed position, and to be
able to negotiate and justify the outcome to national
interests.But this in turn canmakenegotiations more
difficult.A shift tobilateral negotiations will weaken
developing countries’ effectiveness, particularly for
the smallest. These conclusions suggest some areas
where assistance canhelp: in national policy capacity
IDS Bulletin 35.1 Globalisation and Poverty
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they are switching from country to regional offers and
requests.
6. These issues are discussed in more detail in Richards
(2002).
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